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Abstract—Modern distributed software platforms are linking
smart objects such as smartphones, cars and health devices to
the internet. A frequent challenge in the design of such platforms
is determining the appropriate information disclosure protocol to
use when one object interacts with another. For example, how
can a software architect verify that when the platform constrains
the sender to obtain consent from the subject before disclosure
or notifying the subject after disclosure, then the privacy needs
of the subject are addressed? To this end, this research presents
an analysis framework for privacy engineering. We demonstrate
how the framework’s outputs can help software architects achieve
privacy-by-design of software platforms for smart objects.
I. INTRODUCTION
Taint analysis, a technique used for tracking the flow of
sensitive information from data sources to sinks in program
code [1][3], has shown to be effective in dealing with a range
of privacy problems[2][15][8]. But the usage of applications
categorised as benign after taint analysis may still lead to
privacy violation when information is disclosed inappropri-
ately. For example, while the program code for a Facebook
application on a mobile device may be perfectly legitimate,
users can still forward or like messages within Facebook
network in a manner that violates the privacy of the subject.
Furthermore, traditional privacy engineering practices do
not fit well with distributed object scenarios. The common
practice involves three steps. First, the software presents
the user with a privacy preference settings interface to ex-
press a privacy requirement. The software then determines
the appropriate disclosure protocol to ensure the satisfaction
of the privacy requirement. The final step is the enforce-
ment or monitoring adherence to agreed disclosure protocols
[13][6][9]. But described steps are only suitable for self-
contained settings where privacy analysis is independently
executed, and the impact of disclosure behaviour localised
to avoid contagion on other users privacy requirements[4].
Whereas, the distribution of objects introduces new dynamics
that makes these assumptions difficult to hold. For example, it
is more difficult to understand the consequence of information
disclosure on privacy. This is because it is easy for information
once disclosed to reach unintended recipients, and users are
frequently unclear if an information-flow path will ultimately
lead to privacy violation [9][7][14].
One way to address this challenge is an approach that
enables objects to determine alternative disclosure protocol(s)
that maximises privacy requirement satisfaction. The approach
should also at one end provide the capability for objects to
relax or enhance the extent to which a privacy requirement
is satisfied, and at the other end forfeit or update the privacy
requirement depending on emergent disclosure behaviour of
objects. The aim of this research is to show that by leveraging
on knowledge abstraction models [11][10][12], such analytical
approach is achievable over an information-flow path. This is
by analysing traces from the statespace of possible disclosure
protocols to determine the extent to which they each satisfy a
privacy requirement along a path. Subsequently, traces that
result in higher satisfaction levels becomes the preferred
disclosure protocol(s). Our proposed framework is shown in
Figure 1, and takes as input an information-flow path, a privacy
requirement and the desired satisfaction level. The output is
the appropriate disclosure protocol for transferring information
from one object to another. Alternatively, where a satisfaction
level is not achievable, different privacy adaptation measures
are suggested.
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Fig. 1: Privacy analysis framework
II. BELIEFS, UNCERTAINTIES AND PRIVACY
Our knowledge abstraction technique is motivated by the pos-
sible worlds semantics as the logic of knowledge for describing
alternative ways (modes) the world might have been like [5].
This is used to model the transformations in beliefs and uncer-
tainties of users as information is disclosed from one object
to another. Assume information f about Oz flows along the
path of objects Oz→ Bao→ Xan→ Joe→ Rio, where each
object is labelled by the user it represents. Then the disclosure
protocol used for each information-flow will determine the
manner the beliefs and uncertainties that users have about f is
transformed. For instance, if the disclosure protocol αOB where
after Oz sends f to Bao, then Bao reciprocates by acknowledg-
ing the receipt of f is used for Oz → Bao. The consequence
is Bao will belief that Oz knows that it knows f , represented
as BBaoKOzKBaof . Without such acknowledgement, Bao will
be uncertain, represented as BBaoKOzKBaof |¬BBaoKOzKBaof .
Also, considering αBX for Bao → Xan. If before Bao sends f
to Xan, it is granted consent to do so by Oz with the consent
subsequently acknowledged, and Bao notifying Oz after f is
sent. Then, the belief proposition BOzKBaoKXanf will hold
as a result of the notification, and uncertain otherwise. Same
technique of varying disclosure protocols to derive a different
belief/uncertainty transformation can also be considered for
Xan→ Joe and Joe→ Rio.
Consequently, the combination of information request,
consent, sent and/or notice defines the transactions in a
disclosure protocol trace. This results in a statespace contain-
ing 112 traces, each generating a different user belief and
uncertainty transformation after information is disclosed. At
any point, the uncertainty level of an object u about f is the
ratio of uncertainty to total elements in u’s knowledge.
UncertaintyLevel(u, f) =
|UncertaintyElement ∈ Pu|
|Pu|
Conversely, belief level is the ratio of belief to total elements:
BeliefLevel(u, f) = 1− UncertaintyLevel(u, f)
When an object has high uncertainty level, then associated
information is more private, whereas high belief level means
less private information. A privacy objective may therefore
involve regulating uncertainty and belief levels of objects.
Hence, by specifying privacy requirements as assertions
using our proposed knowledge abstraction, it becomes possible
to determine which disclosure protocol(s) will maximise its
satisfaction. For example the requirement that when f is
disclosed, then Oz should belief that Don knows f , and that
Joe knows that it knows f , as well as Bao be uncertain that
Xan knows f , is specified by:
pr1 : if(Oz, Oz, Joe) then{BOzKBaof,BOzKJoeKOzf,
BBaoKXanf |¬BBaoKXanf}
The satisfaction of this type of expression is determined by
checking whether assertion elements in the then segment of the
privacy requirement are true or false in the knowledge of ob-
jects (i.e. Oz and Bao for pr1). Our analysis logic is as follows:
For a given disclosure protocol αx, the privacy requirement pr
is evaluated in the current step ti in object u along the path h.
The extent of satisfaction of pr by u is the ratio of elements
in A that is also contained in Pu to the total elements in A.
This is represented as:
ti : sat(pr, αx, u) =
|(ai ∈ A ∧ ai ∈ Pu)|
|A|
Where A is the set of assertions in pr and Pu the knowledge
of u. The satisfaction of pr along h is then a combination of
extent to which each object in h satisfies pr. This is the mean
sat values achieved along h, and represented by:
h : pathsat(pr) =
t|h|∑
t0
sat(pr, αx, u)
|h|
TABLE I: A comparison of satisfaction analysis outcome for
pr1 using different disclosure protocols
α23 = (Request, grantConsent, send, notice[s,su], ackNotice[su,s], notice[s,r])
s→ r sat : su sat : s sat : r pathsat assertion :pr1
Oz→ Bao 0 0 NA 0.00 BOzKBaof
Bao→ Xan 0 1 NA 0.25 BOzKBaof
BBaoKXanf |¬BBaoKXanf
Xan→ Joe 1 NA NA 0.40 BOzKJoeKOzf
Joe→ Rio 1 NA NA 0.50 BOzKJoeKOzf
α46 = (Request, send, ackSend, notice[s,su], notice[s,r], ackNotice[r,s])
s→ r sat : su sat : s sat : r pathsat assertion :pr1
Oz→ Bao 1 1 NA 1 BOzKBaof
Bao→ Xan 1 0 NA 0.75 BOzKBaof
BBaoKXanf |¬BBaoKXanf
Xan→ Joe 1 NA NA 0.80 BOzKJoeKOzf
Joe→ Rio 1 NA NA 0.83 BOzKJoeKOzf
III. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Based on our analysis logic, we implemented PSat - a tool
for reasoning about the satisfaction of privacy requirements
(www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/ inah/prisoft/). The outcome of analysing
pr1 in PSat using two different disclosure protocols α23
and α46 is as shown in Table I. One way to consider the
viability of disclosure protocols is to compare their relative
sat values. Hence, a disclosure protocol is more viable for a
given information-flow when it yields a higher sat value for
a privacy requirement. For example, consider the information-
flow Oz → Bao, the disclosure protocol α23 is less viable.
This is because it does not yield any satisfaction value for
pr1 in the knowledge of Oz or Bao. Conversely, α46 is more
viable since it yields the maximum satisfaction value for the
same information-flow. For Bao → Xan, while α23 yields no
satisfaction of pr1 in Bao’s knowledge, the maximum value
is generated in Xan’s knowledge. The reverse is the case for
α46. Finally, both protocols are equally viable for Xan→ Joe
and Joe → Rio. Thus, given the higher pathsat value for
α46 it is the preferred disclosure protocol for pr1 compared to
α23. Such insights can be used by software architects to help
make appropriate design decisions, especially in the privacy
engineering of platforms for smart objects.
IV. CONCLUSION
One key finding from our preliminary results is that when
distributed software platforms are instrumented to simply
apply generic disclosure protocols for every information-flow
along a path, then the satisfaction of privacy requirements
is not necessarily maximised. While this is arguably a com-
mon privacy engineering practice, a rigorous evaluation of
the disclosure protocols that fits every information-flow is
necessary for today’s new generation of smart objects. Such
disclosure protocol preferences can also be influenced by
factors such as the privacy requirements satisfaction level that
should be achieved, the degree of freedom it offers users
during interaction and the cost of its execution.
V. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research is supported by EPSRC-ISF 2016 Institutional
support grant award EP/P51133X/1
REFERENCES
[1] S. Arzt, S. Rasthofer, C. Fritz, E. Bodden, A. Bartel, J. Klein,
Y. Le Traon, D. Octeau, and P. McDaniel. Flowdroid: Precise context,
flow, field, object-sensitive and lifecycle-aware taint analysis for android
apps. ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 49(6):259–269, 2014.
[2] V. Avdiienko, K. Kuznetsov, A. Gorla, A. Zeller, S. Arzt, S. Rasthofer,
and E. Bodden. Mining apps for abnormal usage of sensitive data.
In 2015 IEEE/ACM 37th IEEE International Conference on Software
Engineering, volume 1, pages 426–436. IEEE, 2015.
[3] L. N. Q. Do, K. Ali, B. Livshits, E. Bodden, J. Smith, E. Murphy-Hill,
and I. Fraunhofer. Just-in-time static analysis. month, 2016.
[4] E. Ferrara and Z. Yang. Measuring emotional contagion in social media.
PloS one, 10(11):e0142390, 2015.
[5] J. Hintikka. Knowledge and belief: An introduction to the logic of the
two notions, volume 181. Cornell University Press Ithaca, 1962.
[6] J.-M. Horcas, M. Pinto, L. Fuentes, W. Mallouli, and E. M. de Oca.
An approach for deploying and monitoring dynamic security policies.
Computers & Security, 58:20 – 38, 2016.
[7] A. Joshi, T. Finin, L. Kagal, J. Parker, and A. Patwardhan. Security poli-
cies and trust in ubiquitous computing. Philosophical Transactions of
the Royal Society of London A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering
Sciences, 366(1881):3769–3780, 2008.
[8] L. Li, T. F. Bissyande´, D. Octeau, and J. Klein. Reflection-aware
static analysis of android apps. In Proceedings of the 31st IEEE/ACM
International Conference on Automated Software Engineering, ASE
2016, pages 756–761, New York, NY, USA, 2016. ACM.
[9] R. Neisse, G. Steri, D. Geneiatakis, and I. N. Fovino. A privacy
enforcing framework for android applications. Computers & Security,
2016.
[10] I. Omoronyia. The case for privacy awareness requirements. Int. J.
Secur. Softw. Eng., 7(2):19–36, Apr. 2016.
[11] I. Omoronyia. Reasoning with imprecise privacy preferences. In ACM
SIGSOFT International Symposium on the Foundations of Software
Engineering, FSE 2016, New York, NY, USA, 2016. ACM.
[12] I. Omoronyia, L. Cavallaro, M. Salehie, L. Pasquale, and B. Nuseibeh.
Engineering adaptive privacy: On the role of privacy awareness require-
ments. In Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Software
Engineering, ICSE ’13, pages 632–641, Piscataway, NJ, USA, 2013.
IEEE Press.
[13] F. B. Schneider. Enforceable security policies. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst.
Secur., 3(1):30–50, Feb. 2000.
[14] J. Singh, T. F.-M. Pasquier, and J. Bacon. Securing tags to control
information flows within the internet of things. In Recent Advances in
Internet of Things (RIoT), 2015 International Conference on, pages 1–6.
IEEE, 2015.
[15] J. Yang, T. Hance, T. H. Austin, A. Solar-Lezama, C. Flanagan, and
S. Chong. Precise, dynamic information flow for database-backed
applications. In Proceedings of the 37th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on
Programming Language Design and Implementation, pages 631–647.
ACM, 2016.
